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Abstract 
A o-additive probability measure on the real interval [0, l] is defined by considering the 
expected values of “randomly chosen” large formulae of the propositional calculus, where the 
propositional variables are treated as independent random variables on (0, 1) with expected 
value :. Although arising naturally from logical and/or cognitive considerations, this measure is 
extremely complex and displays certain formally pathological features, including infinite 
density at all points of a certain dense subset of [0, 11. Certain variants of the construction are 
also considered. The introduction includes an account of motivation for the study of such 
measures arising from a fundamental problem in inexact reasoning. 
1. Introduction 
The subject of the present paper is the study of a certain countably additive measure 
defined on subintervals of the real interval [0, 11, which arises quite naturally from the 
propositional calculus. The study of this measure (and of certain variants introduced 
in Section 5) was initially differently motivated for the different authors. One such 
motivation was given in [l], where the main results of this paper were stated without 
proof. Below we shall sketch briefly two somewhat different motivations. The first of 
these arises from a natural technical question in pure mathematical logic. The second 
stems from a fundamental problem in uncertain reasoning and shares several points in 
common with the motivation presented in [l], although the two approaches are in 
fact philosophically distinct. 
Our first motivation, arising from pure mathematical logic, is prompted by the 
question: given a random sentence a of the sentential calculus and a random assignment 
of truth values (1 or true, 0 or false) to the propositional variables in CI, what is the 
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probability that cx is true? In order to formulate this question more precisely. Let A be 
the set of formulae determined by some natural representation of the propositional 
calculus with propositional variables pi for i E N. Let us suppose that the pi are also 
given as independent random variables on (0, l} with expected value E(pi) = l/2 for 
all i E Pd. Here pi = 1 is identified with “pi occurs” and pi = 0 is identified with “1 pi 
occurs”. With this interpretation each formula 01 of A also has a natural interpretation 
as a random variable on (0, 1); e.g. if a is (p3 v lp1) v (pz A lp3) then the 
probability that c1 occurs is given by E(a) which is easily calculated to be 7/8 in this 
case. E(E) thus denotes the probability that c( occurs under the assumption that the 
propositional variables are independent random variables with probability l/2 of 
being true. 
Suppose that we now restrict attention to a large finite subset of A, say A,“, where 
A,” consists of all formulae of A which use only the propositional variables pl, . . . ,p,,, 
and are of “complexity” bounded by n. 
We can now pose the question: for a randomly chosen formula c1 of A,” how are the 
possible values of E(a) distributed? Does the pattern of distribution tend to some limit 
as m and n tend to infinity? More precisely, if I is some subinterval of [0, 11, does the 
limit 
exist? 
In the present work we shall show that for perhaps the simplest case of the above 
problem, where A consists of formulae built from literals using only A and v , and 
complexity is measured by the number of binary connectives, the above limit always 
exists and defines a countably additive measure S on subintervals of [0, l] which is 
symmetric about the point l/2. The measure S has certain striking properties which 
are developed in Sections 4 and 5. In particular although S gives measure zero to each 
singleton, and S is continuous with respect to the endpoints of an interval, S is not 
differentiable. In fact in Section 4 we show that S has infinite density at every rational 
point of [0, l] of the form i/2” for i, n E N; in particular S has infinite density at the 
points 0 and 1. However although we know something of the general characteristics of 
S, its detailed structure remains to be computed. Some suggestions as to how this 
might be carried out are contained in Sections 4 and 5. 
Our proof of the existence of S which is contained in Sections 2 and 3 is by no means 
straightforward, and follows a somewhat circuitous route, In Section 2 some prelimi- 
nary combinatorics of the propositional calculus are developed which involve in an 
essential way certain properties of the Catalan numbers & (v). This section contains 
in simplified form much of the combinatorial flavour of later developments, and ends 
with a proof of the fact that S( { 1)) exists and is equal to zero. In Section 3 a measure 
D is defined whose defiition is identical to that of S except that the only formulae of the 
propositional calculus which are considered are those in which no propositional 
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variable occurs more than once. This idealization proves somewhat easier to work 
with combinatorially than S, and it is proved that D exists, is countably additive, and 
gives each singleton measure zero. Finally it is shown that S = D and hence that 
S exists and has the same properties as were proved for D. 
Our second motivation for studying S stems from the apparent necessity in the field 
of uncertain reasoning to make judgements concerning the probability of events in 
contexts where standard statistical techniques are inapplicable, either because of the 
paucity or inappropriateness of the data, or because the underlying notion of prob- 
ability is not a frequentist one. This motivation is quite independent of the first 
motivation, and the reader who is not interested in the partly speculative philosophi- 
cal arguments which follow may safely omit the rest of this section. 
Many different approaches to the above problem of uncertain reasoning have been 
proposed (see e.g. [2,3,4, 51 for a survey). From some points of view, including in 
particular a Bayesian approach, the problem tends to reduce to the problem of 
assigning for each n E N a natural prior probability distribution to the set of probabil- 
ity distributions on (0, 13”; we shall call such a distribution a natural n-prior. This 
latter problem is of course as old as the history of probability theory itself. For the 
case II = 1 Laplace [7] believed that he had the solution: according to him the 
principle of insujficient reason forces us in the absence of all data to choose as natural 
l-prior the uniform distribution on [0, l] (where a probability distribution on (0, l} is 
naturally identified with its expected value). A discussion of Laplace’s reasoning can 
be found e.g. in [6]. However, despite the philosophical interest of Laplace’s objec- 
tivist position, it is fairly clear today that the uniform distribution cannot be derived 
from logical considerations; furthermore, as we shall argue later, there appears to be 
empirical evidence against it. 
Despite much work by Jaynes and others who attempted to revitalize the notion of 
objective probability by the use of information-theoretic and invariance principles 
[S], the programme of deriving natural n-priors from purely logical or analytic 
considerations does not seem to have borne much fruit, even for the case n = 1. Partly 
for this reason, but also because paradoxes arise very easily when insufficient informal 
rigour is employed, even the idea of an objective’ natural n-prior seems to have fallen 
into disrepute and many would argue that the concept is meaningless. Fine [9] for 
example argues that 
“The interpretation of a classical prior distribution is particularly problematic: it 
seems to be an objectification of subjective prior knowledge. Extracting unique 
quantitative probabilities from ignorance or very little prior knowledge can only 
harmfully obscure our ignorance.” 
It should be noted that the force of this argument depends on the following 
presupposition: either human ignorance has no objective structure or, if it does have 
1 Hereinafter we shall use the term objective as a synonym for intersubjective; its use indicates a species 
invariant of human cognition, not a reference to some Platonic reality. 
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such a structure, then we cannot learn anything significant about it. We believe that 
both parts of this disjunction are false. Below we shall indicate why we consider that 
the slow progress of the objectivist approach of classical probability stems rather from 
a failure to recognize that objective considerations are not necessarily purely logical in 
character: it is also necessary to take into account the structure of the cognitive process 
itself: 
In our subsequent discussion of natural n-priors we shall confine ourselves to the 
case n = 1. It must be said that from the standpoint of practical applications to 
uncertain reasoning this case is of very limited interest. However, although we 
believe the general perspective we introduce to be relevant also to’ the analysis 
of multidimensional priors, the derivation of natural n-priors for n > 1 also 
poses other problems which we do not tackle in the present work. We shall 
now outline our reasons for believing S to be a first approximation to a natural 
l-prior. 
For any particular notion of probability 7~ we define a n-descriptor to be a descrip- 
tion r of an experiment with two possible outcomes, say 0 and 1, such that the 
probability that implementing r yields outcome 1, according to the notion of prob- 
ability 71, is an objectively determined real number Prob,(T) with 0 d Prob,(T) d 1. It 
is important to note that in this definition we do not insist that Prob,(T) be calculable 
in practice. 
In our present considerations we shall be principally concerned with case of 
n-descriptors for which n is a particular frequent& notion of probability, nF. To be 
more precise a x,-descriptor r is a description of a “scientific” experiment - i.e., an 
experiment amenable to independent trials such that the outcome of a trial of r has an 
objective character; and Prob,,(T) is defined as the limiting frequency of the outcome 
1 iri an infinite sequence of trials. However we remark that although the exposition 
seems easier for the case when x is nF, the fundamental idea outlined below is of 
interest also in the case of other notions of n-descriptor. 
For a fixed notion of probability 71 each n-descriptor r generates a random variable 
on (0, l} with expected value.Prob,(T). Intuitively it seems meaningful to ask how the 
values Prob,(T) are distributed over the interval [0, 11 as f varies “randomly” over 
such r as are consciously encountered by human beings. 
We now discuss briefly the meaning of this question for the case when 71 is ?rF. 
Rephrasing the problem, we may ask: is there an objectively determined measure 
pL,, defined on subintervals of [0, l] such that for any interval I c [0, l] 
pZF(Z) = the a priori probability that for a “randomly encountered” 
n,-descriptor r, Prob+(r) E I. (*) 
What is at issue here is whether this definition can be given an intuitively unambigu- 
ous meaning. 
We first clarify one point: an encounter of a 7cF-descriptor refers to a conscious 
encounter of a description of an experiment, not to an encounter of the outcome of 
a trial of such an experiment. 
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Despite our intuitions there are clearly formidable problems if one attempts to 
make the definition (*) conceptually. precise using standard notions of probability 
theory. On -the one hand any attempt to explain (*) theoretically would appear 
hopeless in view of our total lack of understanding of the phenomenon of human 
consciousness; on the other hand any empirically based interpretation of the defini- 
tion would necessarily involve arbitrary factors, and so could only be regarded as 
approximate definition. 
Well-defined empirically based approximations to the definition of px, do however 
exist; they are worth serious consideration because they coud provide us with valuable 
evidence for (or against) the existence of pn,. Examples of such approximations may 
be obtained by restricting the domain of x,-descriptors under consideration to those 
r which are recorded in some particular domain 9 of scientific literature, and for 
which ProbZf(T) is also recorded to within some specified accuracy, say 2. Let us 
denote the set of such xc,-descriptors by Desc(9,n). The notion of “randomly encoun- 
tered x,-descriptor” can now be given an obvious interpretation by counting occur- 
rences in 9 of n,-descriptors belonging to Desc(9J). Let us denote the resulting 
measure, defined analogousfy to pL,,, by /*$“. Notice that while $;” is a conceptual 
approximation to pL,,, the former measure can in principle be empirically calculated. 
Now, if it should turn out that for small* 1, > 0 a wide range of possible 9 were to 
yield measures pz;” with very similar characteristics, this would provide interesting 
empirical evidence for the existence of pZF. The measure pnF, if it exists, could be 
regarded as an ideal limit of the various possible pz;*. 
For the remainder of this section we shall assume the existence of p,+.. The idea here 
is that pZF is an invariant of the human cognitive apparatus; it is the objective kernel 
underlying any of the many possible empirically based frequentist approximations to 
the definition (*). Although such approximations may have the merit of greater 
transparency or computability, they will however ‘necessarily include certain arbitrary 
distorting factors. 
It might be objected here that our ideas add nothing to the philosophical notions of 
objective prior probability of say Laplace [7] or Keynes [l 11, except perhaps an 
element of confusion. We stress however that what we are suggesting is not that pn, is 
a logical invariant, but rather a cognitive invariant, i.e., an objective property of the 
praxis of human consciousness. pn, would thus be an invariant of the human cognitive 
apparatus with a similar epistemological status to that of Chomsky’s notion of 
universal grammar (see e.g. Chomsky [12]). 
We should note that the possibility of finding a purely mathematical ddfinition of (*) 
is by no means precluded by our discussion above; indeed, the definition of the 
measure S may be regarded as a first attempt at such a formalization. The problem of 
showing any such definition to be a correct formalization of (*) is then philosophically 
analogous to the problem of showing Church’s thesis to be correct. In both cases 
Z I should however be large enough to allow Desc(9, i) to be a reasonably sized saqple. 
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proof is impossible since what is required is to show that a mathematical definition 
corresponds exactly to an intuition. Nevertheless in both cases evidence of a partly 
empirical nature can be accumulated. 
Let us now consider a possible approach to modelling p,+ mathematically. A rrF- 
descriptor r arises in an individual consciousness from a many-tiered complex of 
mental processes involving concepts previously acquired from collective human 
experience, or abstracted from innate cognitive structures. Whatever the exact nature 
of the unknown processes involved, it seems probable that a crucial part of the 
synthesis of r must consist of operations of a logical character. If this were not the 
case, it would appear difficult to explain either the objective character of the final 
product, r, or the precision of communicability of the concepts involved in the 
formulation of I’, which is implied by this objectivity. This idea in turn suggests that 
we should attempt to model random rc,-descriptors as random formulae of large 
complexity in some logical calculus. Two obvious problems arise here however: 
(i) which logical calculus should we choose? 
(ii) how should the probabilities attached to atomic propositions be distributed? 
From a purely technical point of view the simplest solutions to these problems are 
(i)’ to choose some standard version of the propositional calculus, and (ii)’ to treat the 
propositional variables variables as independent random variables with probability 
l/2 of being true. The construction of the measure S may thus be regarded as an 
attempt to model pL,, on the basis of certain highly simplistic assumptions. This 
however does not necessarily disqualify S as a plausible first approximation to I**,. 
Indeed, our technical investigations in the present work suggest that many of the most 
plausible variants of S share several of its general features: in particular a tendency for 
the measure to have fractal-like characteristics and to concentrate near to 0,l and l/2, 
with lesser concentrations at other points of the form i/2”. Some variants of the 
construction of S are considered briefly in Section 5 below. 
It is instructive to compare the properties of S with, on the one hand, our intuitions 
concerning the nature of pn,, and on the other hand the properties of the symmetric 
l-dimensional Dirichlet priors (including the uniform prior) which arise from the 
work of Carnap and the logical probabilists. The latter priors, which have density 
functions that are proportional to ~‘(1 - x)* for some parameter tx > - 1, may be 
derived naturally from Carnap’s continuum of inductive definitions [lo]. (An account 
of Carnap’s work and a critique of his assumptions can be found in Paris [13] or 
Fine [9].) 
Let us consider first the property of S of tending to concentrate measure near 0 and 
1. There are, we feel, good empirical grounds for believing that pn, shares the same 
property. It is for example remarkably easy to formulate using everyday concepts 
a x,-descriptor r with extremely small but non-zero associated probability Prob,,(T), 
let us say with Prob,,(T) < lo-‘*. 
Simple examples of such a r could be constructed from either of the following ideas: 
(a) The probability that half the contents of a cup of coffee at rest on a table will, 
without any external stimulus, rise up and hit the ceiling. 
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(b) The probability that an individual will be struck by lightning while walking to 
work on two successive days. 
The above examples are extreme in that both the probabilities involved are 
(presumably) astronomically small. Yet they illustrate well the following point: since, 
at a generous estimate, an individual cannot consciously consider more than lo8 rcF- 
descriptors in a lifetime, how is it possible that concepts associated with such small 
probabilities occur to us so easily, unless some structural property of our cognitive 
“grammar” forces the measure pn, to be particularly dense near to 0 (and so, by 
duality, near to l)? 
It should be noted that the Dirichlet priors referred to above do not have the 
property just mentioned unless c( < 0. But notice also that for CI < 0 these priors have 
a minimum density at x = l/2. We will now give an intuitive argument to justify the 
assertion that, by contrast, p%, has high concentrations of measure not only near 0 and 
1, but also near l/2, and more generally near any point of the form i/2” for i, II E N, 
i d 2” (with the obvious restriction that n be of “feasible” size). 
The argument is based on the following intuitions: 
(A) Partial orderings of a domain of phenomena are an essential feature of human 
cognition. 
(B) Given two partial orderings of a domain of phenomena, it is not uncommon for 
these orderings to be nearly stochastically independent, in the sense that the probabil- 
ity that the orderings agree when applied to two random elements of the domain 
which are comparable with respect to both orderings is close to l/2. 
The ideas contained in (A) and (B) above suggest the n,-descriptors with probabilit- 
ies very close to l/2 occur disproportionally often in real everyday contexts which are 
quite different in character from special physical experiments such as the tossing of 
a nearly ideal coin. As an example, consider the a priori probability that, if the names 
of the winner and the runner-up in an election are spelled backwards, the winner’s 
name will be prior to the runner-up’s in the lexicographic ordering. 
If we accept the above argument that p,+ will have a concentration of measure near 
to l/2, then it is easy to extend the argument to all points of the form i/2” for 
0 < i < 2”, simply by considering Boolean combinations of stochastically independent 
phenomena. (A formal result along these lines is given in Lemma 3.2(i) below.) 
We conclude this introduction with a brief philosophical observation. The cognitive 
perspective from which we have approached the classical problem of defining objec- 
tive prior probability has by no means eliminated the principle of insufficient reason, 
but has only led to its reintroduction at a higher level, namely that of the cognitive 
model. Thus in our construction of S the uniform distribution is applied to the space 
of logical forms A:. In effect this new version of the principle can be reexpressed as 
follows: leaving aside the question as to whether the space of rr,-descriptors can be 
reasonably modelled by the space of random formulae A,” for large m and n, the 
additional assumption which is made is that the probability of a human mind 
consciously alighting on a rc,-descriptor with probability in a specified interval I is 
directly proportional to the size of the set of all n,-descriptors whose probabilities lie 
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in I. In other words the a priori probability of a rrc,-descriptor r being consciously 
considered is independent of the value of Prob_ (r). 
Whatever the shortcomings may be of our particular model of the space of 
x,-descriptors, the above application of the principle of insufficient reason seems to us 
more intuitively justified than the classical derivation of the uniform prior which 
applies the principle to a mathematical abstraction, the interval [0, l] of the real line, 
rather than to a cognitive model. 
2. Exact statement of the problem 
Let A be some natural representation of the propositional calculus. For definiteness 
say the formulae of A are built up using only v and A from literals, pi, lpi (denoted 
by f pi), where i E N and the pi are propositional variables. For IZ, m E N and m > 0 
let 
A: = (010 is a formula of A built from &pO,..., f~,,_~ 
using at most n binary connectives}. 
For c( E A,” let 
where Val{p,, . . . , pm_ 1 } is the set of valuations of propositional variables 
p0 ,..., p,,_i,i.e.,mapsfrom {pO ,..., P,,_~} into {O,l} where 1 =true,O=fulse. 
Notice that if o! E A:, then cl, the dual of c(, formed by replacing each A , v , -tpi in 
CI by V,A, fpi respectively, is also in A,” and h(E) = 1 - h(a) since for 
VE Vul{p,, . . . ,Pm-I), wq = 1 - V(a). 
For any interval I G [0, l] we define 
Here the interval I may be open, closed or half-open. In case of a degenerate interval 
[a, a] we shall write S(u) in place of S([a, a]), and more generally we shall write 
S(a, b] for S((u, b]) etc. 
In Section 3 we shall show that the above is a correct definition, i.e. that the limit on 
the right-hand side exists. We shall then derive some properties of S. 
Notice that h(a) may also be viewed as the expected (truth) value of the sentence 
c( when the pi are treated as independent random propositional variables which are 
true (i.e., take value 1) with probability 4 and false (i.e., take value 0) with probability 
4. For the present it will be useful to be able to move backwards and forwards between 
both viewpoints. In the final section we shall generalize some of our results by treating 
the pi is independent random variables with more general associated distributions. 
First we need some combinatorial observations. 
J.B. Paris et al. /Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 70 (1994) 243-285 251 
Preliminary combinatorics 
Definition 2.1. For it E N, the nth Catalan number b, is defined by 
The Catalan numbers will be very relevant to this paper because b, is the number 
of ways of bracketing n applications of a binary operation, l say, on an object, o 
say. (For example, for n = 2 there are just two such possibilities, (o*(o*o)) and 
((o l o) l o).) Before proving this well-known result it will be useful to have the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 2.2. For n E N 
(b) f !$? = 2(1 -JZ) forO<xd 1. 
i=O 
(c) ;,g ;= 1. 
L-O 
(4 b n+l = b,bo + b,mIb, + ... + bob,. 
Proof. (a) is obvious. 
(b) follows by using the binomial theorem to expand fi and then equating 
coefficients. 
(c) follows from (b). 
It only remains to prove (d). By (b) 
m b,xi+l 
C 4i ‘--2=2&E forOdx<l. 
i=O 
Consequently 
( z0yy-4( z0q)+4=4(1 -x) forO<x< 1. 
Comparing coefficients of xi+ ’ for i 2 1 we obtain the desired recursive relation. 0 
Lemma 2.3. The number of ways of bracketing a product of (n + 1) copies of an object 
by n applications of a binary operation is b,. 
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Proof. Let /In denote the number of such expressions. Then /I0 = 1 and by considering 
the position of the last, or principal, application we obtain 
B .+1=BnPo+Bn-181+...+BoB. forn>O. 
Since PO = b0 the lemma follows from Lemma 2.2(d). 0 
In place of A: we shall initially concentrate on classes 2; defined by 
,@ = { 8 18 is a formula of A built from f pO, . . . , f p,,, _ I using exactly n binary 
connectives}, 
that is, 2; = A,” - A,“_ 1 for n > 0. Let a”,” = I,@[. The following corollary to Lemma 
2.3 is straightforward. 
Corollary 2.4. We have 
-m a, = 22n+lmn+lb “. 
Hencefor m > 0 and n > 1 
1 z,“_ 1 1 
->- 
8m 6,” \16m asn+a3. 
Proof. The expression for 2,” follows immediately. Furthermore 
z,“_ 1 1 bn-1 1 n+l 
-=4rn b, =8m2n-1 z.” 
which yields the remaining part of Corollary 2.4. 0 
Let * (c(, fi) denote a formula of one of the four forms: M A /I, a v /3, /? A ~1, /3 v ~1. 
From the above corollary it follows that for large n roughly one half of 2; are of the 
form * ( f pi, LX). 
Lemma 2.5. For any E > 0 there is a k E N such thatfor all non-zero m, n the proportion 
of formulae of 2: which are of the form *(CC, fl) where CI has at most k connectives, is 
greater than 1 - E. 
Proof. Note first that for n < k the conclusion holds trivially. Now given k E N, n > k 
and m, the proportion il referred to is 
By Corollary 2.4 this is just 
i = 2&b,-1 + bib”-2 + ... + b&n-k-r) 
b, 
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By Lemma 2.2(a), 
SO 
by Lemma 2.2(c) as required. 0 
Lemma 2.6. Let E > 0 be given. Let r E N, I > log, (3/c). Then there is a k E N such that 
for m > 3((k + l)r)‘/e and n > kr the proportion of the formulae of 2: which are of the 
f orm 
*1(c(1*2(cIz*3(a3...*,(tL,,p)...))), XiEAp for i= l,...,r (2) 
where all the variables occuring in GIN, . . . , LX, are distinct (none occurs twice) and at least 
one of the *,, *2, . . . , ** is a conjunction, is greater than 1 - E. 
Proof. Repeatedly using Lemma 2.5 (with e/3r in place of E) we see that the proportion 
of formulae of 27 of the form (2) is greater than 
( 1 1-c &-;. 
Out of all formulae of .@ only proportion l/2’ has the property that all the *i, 
i= l,... , r are v . By the definition of r, l/2’ < 43, so certainly if we assume that at 
least one of the *i)s is a conjunction we will not be discarding more than another 43 of 
the formulae of 2:. 
We now consider formulae of 2.” of the form (2) with the further restriction that all 
variables occuring in CQ , . . . , tl, are distinct. The number of variables occuring in 
Ml,..., a, is at most (k + l)r. It follows that the proportion of formulae of the form (2) 
where the variables occuring in c(r) . . . , a, are all distinct is at least 
m!/(m - (k + l)r)! 
( 
m-(k+ I)r+ 1 (k+l)r 
m(k+ i)r > m 1 
= 
( 
l_(k+l)r-l (k+l)r ,,_((k+l)r)’ ,1_~ 
m > m 3 
since m > ((k + l)r)‘/(E/3). 
Thus if we consider formulae of the form (2) such that at least one of the 
*1, *2, . . . , *r is a conjunction and such that all the variables occurring in M 1, . . . , a, are 
distinct, we find that the proportion of formulae of ,@’ which are not of this type is less 
than E/3 + E/3 + ~/3 = E. q 
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exists. Whenever they exist, both limits are equal. 
(3) 
Proof. Recall that 6,” = Iir(. Let us write a.” for IA.“I. Note that for any p E IV, 
a; = xi=, ii: since, for a fixed m, the /$J’ are disjoint and Ap” = upkEO A”,“. Recall that 
by Corollary 2.4, for any k > 2, &‘_ I/&” Q 1/8m and Zr/$ = 1/4m. 
Thus we can estimate 
Also 
~ l{~d’IWW)I ~ l{~dI&W)I 1 
a”,” (Sm/(Sm - 1)) -Ill a, 8m 
The lemma follows. 0 
We now prove a special, but rather interesting, case of the main theorem of the next 
section. 
Theorem 2.8. S(1) exists and equals 0. By symmetry S(0) exists and also equals 0. 
Proof. By the previous lemma, S(1) exists iff 
exists and if it exists then S(1) is equal to this limit. 
Let CL be a formula of the form (2) such that all the variables occurring in czl, . . . , cc, 
are distinct and such that at least one of the * 1, *2, . . . , ** is a conjunction. Then CI is 
equivalent to a formula of the form y A 6 such that all propositional variables in y are 
distinct. By induction on the length of y it is easy to see that such a formula cannot be 
a tautology (nor a contradiction); thus h(a) # 1. 
Consequently by the Lemma 2.6 the above limit is 0. 0 
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3. The existence of S 
In order to prove the general result we shall first consider the simpler case of 
formulae without repeated propositional variables. 
Let zn be defined by: 
A”, = { 6 119 is a formula of A built from f p ,,, . . . , k p,, using exactly n binary 
connectives and such that, reading from the left the ith propositional 
variable in 8 is pi}. 
and define, for any interval I G [0, 11, 
(4) 
We shall show in Theorem 3.10 that this limit exists for any subinterval I of [0, 11, 
open, closed or halfopen. We shall then show in Theorem 3.11 that 
thus establishing the main result of thissection. 
Notice that, by Lemma 2.3, 
I,& = 2’“+lb,. 
In order to show that the limit (4) exists we shall use a method from probability theory 
for which we require some notation. For n E N and any I c [0, l] let 
D n (z)= l~~~A”,lWW~l 
Ml . 
Then D, is a measure on the subsets of [0, l] which concentrates all measure on the 
points h(a) for tx E A”,, that is on points of the form i/2”+’ for 0 < i d 2”+l. Also since 
cl E A”. whenever M E &,, D,(h(cr)) = D,(h(E)) = D,(l - h(a)) so D, is symmetric, i.e., 
D,(x) = D,(l - x) for x E [0, 11. 
For 0 d a d 1 let U, be the measure on [0, l] which concentrates all measure on a, 
that is, for Z E [0, 11, 
U,(Z) = 
i 
1 if a E I, 
0 otherwise. 
Then Do = Uljz, since A’, = { _+ p,,}, and 
(5) 
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Define 
u, v ub = Uo+b-ab, 
u,* ub = f(u, A ub) + +(ua v ub), 
and, more generally, 
Notice that the operations A , v and * are commutative and distributive with 
respect to addition, and that A and v are also associative. But * is not associative as 
can be seen by considering (D, *Do) * (D, * D,,) and Do *(Do * (Do * Do)). 
The significance of the operation * lies in the following fact: 







Proof. Every tl E 2, + 1 is either of the form (/? A v’) or of the form (fi v y’) where 
/3E&forsomei=O,... , n and y E A”,_i, where y equals y’ with pj replaced by pj_ i for 
j=i+l , . . . , n + 1. These p, y are uniquely determined, h(y) = h(y’) and 
W A Y’) = W).W)> W v Y’) = h(P) + WY) - W9.W. 
Hence 
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from which the result follows since 
I/Q = 22’+rbi, IA”,-il = 22”-2i+lbn_i, lA”,+rl= 22n+2+1b”+I. 0 
By straightforward induction on n we now obtain: 
Lemma 3.2. (i) D,(a) > 0 iJj’ a = i/2”+‘for some odd i with 1 d i < 2nf’. 
(ii) 0,(1/2”+‘) = l/2”. q 
Let ._P be the set of functions F of the form XI= 1 ci Uai for some finite sequence 
Ciy ...) C, E R such that Cl= 1 Ci = 1 and F(x) = F(l - x) 2 0 for all x E [0, 11. 
Lemma 3.3. Let F, G E % and a E [0, 11. Then 
(i) F A G(a) = F v G(l - a), 
(ii) F*G(a) = F*G(l -a). 0 
Notice that the D, E % and 9 is closed under the * operation. 
Now for f: [0, 1] + R and F = Cl= 1 Ci U,,i E % define 
Er(f(x)) = i cif(ai) = C f(x)F(x). 
i=l F(x)>0 
That is, EF(f(x)) is the expected value off(x) with respect to the measure (or 
distribution) F. Notice that for F as above E,(l) = I:= 1 Ci = 1. (We use the obvious 
notation where 1 in the expression E,(l) stands for the function assigning 1 to each 
real number). 
Lemma 3.4. For all F, G E % and k > 0: 
(i) EF(xk) = EF(l - x)~, 
(ii) EF(x) = 4, 
(iii) EFeG(xk) = t(l + ( - l)k)E,(~k)EG(~k) + cf’r,’ f ( - l)‘E,(x’)&(~‘)(f). 
Proof. (i) Since F(x) = F(l - x), 
Er(x’) = c xkF(x) = 1 (I - x)~F(~ - x) 
F(X)>0 F(x)>0 
= ,,;>o (1 - x)~F(x) = E,((l - x)“). 
(ii) By (i), EF(x) = EF(l - x) = E,(l) - EF(x), so 2E,(x) = E,(l) = 1. 
(iii) Let F = x1= r ci U,,, G = I;= 1 dj U,,. Then 
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Moreover, 
E u, ,, u<(x”) = (ae)k = Eu,(x~)EuJx~), 
E u. v ue(~k) = (a + e - ~e)~ = (1 - (1 - a) (1 - e))k 
= .f ( - 1)‘U - 4*(1 - 4’C) 
= r;. ( - l)‘Eue(U - 4’)Eu.(U - x)7(:), 
EFeG(xk) = i 2 T E,m;(xk)E~.,(xk) 
i=l j=l 
+ i f: f T( - l)‘I&,((l - x)‘)Euej((l -4’)(f) 
rzOi=l j=l 
k 
= 3 EF(xk)EG(xk) + c i( - l)‘E,((l - $)EG((~ - x)7(:). 
r=O 
The result now follows by moving over the term for r = k in this sum and 
using (i). 0 
Before proceeding further we introduce a notation for certain coefficients 
arise naturally from the Catalan numbers and which play an important role 
sequel. 




bd’n-t- 1 bk 
b, ’ 
(ii) pk = - 
qk+” 
It is easily seen from Lemma 2.3 that $ is the proportion of formulae of ,& (or of 
2:) which are of the form B A y or /I v y where B has exactly k binary connectives. 
Lemma 3.6. For all k, n E N with n 2 1, k < n 
n-l 
(vi) c pk = 4 - 2 cn + l)b,, 
k=O 
(vii) hm p”;(n+k),Z] = 0. 
“-+UG 
Proof. (i), (ii) and (iv) follow straightforwardly from the definitions and from 
Lemma 2.2. 
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By repeated use of Lemma 2.2(a) we obtain 
bn-k-l 1 - __ 
b, I qk+’ 
which yields (iii), (v) and (vii). 
(vi) is proved by induction on IZ. Smce ,u~ = $, ~1~ = A, we have p. = 4 - 4~~ and 
thus (vi) holds for IZ = 1. Now assume it holds for some n 2 1. Then 
k$o & = $ - 2(n + 1)/b + /-b, = 4 - (2n + 1),h- 
Also 
(2n + l)/.& = (2n + l)-& 
( > 
‘,” -& = 2(n + 2)PL,+1 
and consequently (vi) holds for n + 1, too. 0 
Notice that with this new notation Lemma 3.1 is neatly expressed by the equation 
D n+l =i$oPlil Di*Dn-i. 
Lemma 3.7. Let k E N. Then 
(i) For any E > 0 there exist d, to E N such that for all n, m B to, 
IED,+I(~‘) - ED,+~ (Xk)I < f klED,_,(Xk) - ED,,_,/ + E. 
i=O 
(ii) lim EDn(xk) exists. 
!I+00 
Proof. Both (i) and (ii) are proved simultaneously by induction on k. 
Clearly both hold for k = 0. Now assume (i) and (ii) for r d k - 1. We first prove (i) 
for k. Since by Lemma 3.6(iii) and (iv), lim,, ocl ~1 = pi and C,p”_ ,,pi = f , given E > 0 we 
can pick d such that 
2&l-E 
i=O 8 
and then pick to > 2d such that for n > to 
lP;+l - Pil G 16(dE+ 1) for all i < d 
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so that 
and by Lemma 3.6(i) and (ii) 
n-d-l 
i=$+I G+l Q $ 
Then for n, m > to, 
E ~,+l(x~) - ED,,,,~ (X”) = i 2Pi(Eoi*on_,(Xk) - ED,*D._~(x~)) 
i=O 
+ i (2(@+’ - pi)) ED,*o._i(Xk) - i (2(&“+’ - pi))Er+*nI_a(Xk) 
i=O i=O 
n-d- 1 m-d-l 
+ 1 p;+l ED,.D~-,(x~) - 1 &“+l J%~.D~_,(x”). 
i=d+l i=d+l 
Now since xk d x for k > 1, x E [0, 11, it follows that ED~,~“_~(x~) < EDiaDn_;(x) = f. 
So the last four terms in the above are bounded in modulus by s/8. Concerning the 
first term, by Lemma 3.4, 
Eo,eDn_,(xk) - ED,.D~_~(~~) 
= f ~%,(x")(E,,_,(x~) - E~m_i(x~))(l + ( - l)k) 
k-l 
+ 4 .so (- ~)'ED,(~')(ED,_~(~') - ED,_,) 
and, by inductive hypothesis (ii), the latter term can be made arbitrarily small for n, m 
sufficiently large. The result now follows since 0 < EDi < EDi = 3. 
To show (ii) for k (given (i) for k), suppose on the contrary that 
lim SUP IED” - ED,,,(xk)I = b > 0. 
f-+crz m,n > t 
Pick E > 0 small and, without loss of generality suppose that in (i) d is chosen so that, 
additionally, 
IED” - ED,,,(xk)( S b + c 
for all n, m > d. Now pick, n, m > to ( 2 2d) such that 
IED,+, (xk) - ED,,,+l(~k)l > b - E. 
Then by (i) we obtain 
b-c< i pi(b+E)+E 
i=O 
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which gives the required contradiction since 
At this point we could show that D, if it exists, could not be equal to the uniform 
distribution. This would follow since for the uniform distribution the expected value 
of x2 is 3 whilst it is easy to check that if D exists then 
ED(x2) = lim ED,(x2) 
n+‘x 
and, using Lemma 3.7, this limit is bounded above 3. Instead however we shall press 
on and prove some properties of D which immediately distinguish it from the uniform 
distribution. 
Before proving that D exists we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.8. Let a E [0, 11. Thenfir any 6 > 0 there is no E N and E > 0 such thatfor all 
n > no, 
&((a - E, U + E) A [o, 11) < 6. 
Proof. Suppose not, so for some a E [0, 1],6 > 0 there are i. -C il < i2 < ..such that 
1 1 
Din a--,a+- n+l n+l 
for all n E N. We may assume a, 6 chosen so that for no b E [O, l] are there 
j. < j, < j, < e.. such that 
b+ 
for all n E N. Hence for each b E [O, l] there is Jb E N such that for all n 2 Jb, 
(( 1 D, b--, Jb + 1 b+&) n[O,ll)<T. 
Now by Lemma 3.6 pick d E N and to 2 2d such that for m 3 to, 
i 2p,“+‘>1-$. 
j=O 
Then for large n (so that n > to) 
Din (( 1 a---,,+&) nC0.11) n+l 
d 














the first of these corresponding to conjunctions, the second to disjunctions. (Notice 
that Dj(0) = Dj(l) = 0 so there is no problem with the divisors here.) Now for 
n sufficiently large the lengths of the intervals 
a 1 1 --~ 
b 
a+- 
b(n + 1)’ b b(n + 1) ) 
n [O, 11, 
and 
-_ b n CO, 11, 
(where b is such that D,(b) > 0 for somej < d) is less than l/JC, where c is the midpoint 
of the interval, and for each such pair one of them will be null except in the exceptional 
circumstance that b = a (i.e., Dj(U) > 0) and, by Lemma 3.2, this is possible for at most 
onej. Thus, using (6) and substituting in (7) and allowing the worst case of Do(a) > 0, 
we obtain, for sufficiently large n, 
(( 1 Din a--,a+ n+l ) 1 n L-0911 




56 i,56 s 316 
<s+P~~+~+~ asn+ co, 
since by Lemma 3.6(iii), lim,,, j$ = i. This gives the required contradiction. 0 
Theorem 3.9. For 0 d a d b G 1, 
DC@, 4) = lim &((a, b)) 
“-rCC 
exists and similarly for closed and halfopen intervals. 
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Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there exist A2 < A1 such that for arbitrarily large 
n, m 
&((a, b)) < & < A < &I((& b)). 
Let 6 > 0 be small and by Lemma 3.8 pick E > 0 such that for all n eventually 
&((a - E, a + E) n [o, I]), D,((b - E, b + E) n [0, 11) < 6. 
Now letf(x) be a polynomial such that for x E [0, l] 
0 <f(x) < 6 if xba-&orb+s<x, 
O<f(x)< 1 +6 ifxE(a-a,a+&)u(b--&,b+&), 
ldf(x)<1+6 ifxE[a+E,b-s]. 
Then, by consideringf(x) on [a + E, b - E], there are arbitrarily large m for which 
&,(.0x)) 2 21 - 26, 
and similarly arbitrarily large n for which 
&n(f(x)) d (2, + 26)(1 + 6) + 6, 
which, for small 6, contradicts Lemma 3.7(ii). 0 
Let 9 denote the algebra of subsets of [0, l] finitely generated by the halfopen 
intervals. We say that a measure T on 9 is symmetric if T(A) = T(A) for all A E 9, 
where A= {x1(1 -x)EA}. 
Theorem 3.10. D is a continuous, symmetric, countably additive measure on f. In 
particular for a E [O, 11, D(a) = 0. 
Proof. That D is a symmetric finitely additive measure follows from Theorem 3.9 and, 
by Lemma 3.8 and Theorem 3.9 again, D is continuous. These two together imply that 
D is countably additive by a standard theorem (see for example [14]). 0 
Notice that by classical results in measure theory D can further be extended to 
a countably additive measure on the Bore1 subsets of [0, 11. 
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section. 
Theorem 3.11. For any interval I c [0, l] the measure 
exists and, furthermore, equals D(1). 
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Proof. By Lemma 2.7 it is enough to show this result with ir in place of A:. Define 
D,“EF by 
For 6’ E 2; let 19” E A”, be the result of replacing the ith propositional variable in 
8 (reading from the left) by pi for i = 0, . . . , n. 
The following lemma connects these 0.” to the D,. 
Lemma 3.12. Given E > 0 and k E N there exists no such that for n, m 2 no 
I J%“(Xk) - %:b”) I < E. 
Proof. Since ED,(xo) = En;(xO) = 1 and En.(x’) = E&x’) = 3, the cases of k = 0, 1 
are trivial. 
Fix E and k > 1. Let j > log, (4k/e). Then by Lemma 2.6 there is q E N such that for 
m large (m > 6((q + l)j)‘/.s) and n > qj, 1 Zr( > (1 - g/2)1 irl where ZF is the set of 
8 E 2; of the form 
where ur, . . . , C(j E 2: have no propositional variables repeated in, or amongst, them. 
AS previously we use *i(Cr, B) to denote any of the four forms a A p, p v ~1, ~1 A p, 
/I v CC. Then, as each 8” arises from I ,$“I/1 2” I = m"+ ’ possible 8, 
IED; - ED~(x~)I = 1 (h(e)k - h(Wk) jy&, 
BEi:: ” 
< c (h(e)k - h(ey) 1 + 
IA7 
1 @uvk - wm)k) 
eez.” 0e.z: 
0 4 z: 




To estimate the first term let 8 E Z; be as above and let 01, . . . , 02, be all the 
sentences it is possible to form from 0 by replacing each *i for i = 1, . . . ,j by A or v . 
Let t?= {e,, . . . . e2j} and notice that these 8partition Zr. For such a 8 let p*,, . . . ,pI, 
be the propositional variables appearing in c(~, .. . , C(j and let pr;, . _. , pr; be the corres- 
ponding variables in 8”. Then for v a randomly chosen member of 
vai{p,,, . . . pr,} 
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the probability that u will not already decide a randomly chosen member of eis 
ifi1 (Prob(u(ai) = 1 and *i = A) + Prob(a(ai) = 0 and ei = v)) 
= ifi (f Prob(u(ai) = 1) + 3 Prob(u(mi) = 0)) = 2-j. 
Furthermore, if v E Val{p,,, . . . ,p,,} and u’ E Val{p,;, . . . ,pr;} is defined by 
u’(pl;) = u(pl,) then u already decides 19 true/false just if u’ already decides 8” 
true/false. Hence 
Therefore, for C#I E 0 
IW4) - h(4”)l 
= c Y(4) Wrn) 
YE Val{p, ,..., /A.-,) 




Y(4) Y(4) = -+ c ___- c 
w(V) w (4”) 






decides q4 Y decides I#I” w 
c 
i 
c Y(4) w(4’7 ~ - + 
L’E Val{p,, v..., P,,} 
2” c ~ 
YlU w 2 c.I 
2n+1 
u does not decide 4 YE Va/{p,,...,p._,} WE val{P,,...,P.] 
(9) 
This first term is zero whilst the second term is at most 
c ; 
UE Val{p ,,....1 P,.] 
~1 does not decides $ 
since both sums involved are between 0 and l/2’. Using (9) and summing over C#J gives 
c [h(4) - h(C#I”)( d 2’4 = 1. (10) 
45Eii 
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Now in order to bound the first term in (S), we observe that since the &partition Zr, 
which gives the required bound of &/2. q 
Returning to the proof of Theorem 3.11, first notice that Lemma 3.8 holds with 
0,” in place of D,. For suppose that for any E > 0 there are arbitrarily large m, n such 
that 
Dr((a - E, a + E) n [0, 11) > &, > 0. 
Pick go > 0 such that for all n eventually 
&((a - 60, a + co) n CO, 11) < -5 ho. 
Then by considering a polynomialf(x) for which 
0 <j.(x) < d &I for 0 d x < a - &o or a + ~~ < x d 1, 
0 < f(x) < 1 for a - &g < X < a - 3 Eg or U + 3 &g < X < a + Eg, 
2 <f(x) d 1 for u-~~~<x<u+~E~, 
we obtain E,“(S(x)) < 3 ho and ED;(f(x)) 2 2 do for arbitrarily large m, II, contradic- 
ting Lemma 3.12. 
Just as in the proof of Theorem 3.9 we can now show that for 0 < a < b < 1 
lim Dr(a, b) = lim D,(u, b) = D(a, b) 
m.n+cc ?I+4 
and similarly for halfopen and closed intervals so the result follows. 0 
4. The ruggedness of the measure S 
In the previous sections we established that the measures D and S both exist and are 
in fact the same measure. Moreover, this measure is well behaved to the extent that it 
is continuous. As an indicator of “smoothness” however the continuity of D is highly 
deceptive. We shall show in this section that D is not differentiable on a dense set of 
points, namely at all points of the form i/2” in the interval [0, 11. Moreover, in the 
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neighbourhood of any such point, a, the “density” of the measure D approaches 
infinity in the following sense: 
lim D((a - 6, a + 4 n CO, 11) = co. 
E-0 E 
The key to these results is provided by a certain infinite system of linear equations 
relating the measures of infinitely many subintervals of [0, 11. These equations are 
stated in Theorem 4.2. We do not know whether these equations are sufficient to 
characterise D completely in the class of continuous, normalised, symmetric measures, 
although this seems probable. The proof that the equations hold is technically rather 
complicated. The equations are however of some interest which is independent of the 
results in this section because, combined with estimates given by calculation of the 
values of the ED(X”), they appear to give a plausible method of computing D to within 
reasonable accuracy. This topic is however not pursued in the present paper. 
We require some notation. Let I = (a, b) denote any open interval with 
O~a~b~1.Then~willdenote(1-b,1-a)andforc~[W~,c~Zwilldenotethe 
interval (ca, cb). This notation extends in an obvious way to closed or halfopen 
intervals I. I is called simple if no point of the form 2-k lies in I. Given I as above and 
n E N, I,, denotes {i E FY 1 i/2”+ ’ E I}. The height of I, o(Z), is defined by 
o(Z) = the greatest d E N s.t. Z c (0,2-‘). 
Note that a(Z) > 0 iff Z E (0, f). Also if Z is simple then [log, i] = n - a(Z) for all 
i E I,. Otherwise [log, i] < IZ - o(Z). 
We need a few easy computational facts which are collected together in the 
following lemma. 
Lemma 4.1. Let Z be an interval as above, and let r, s, i be odd natural numbers such that 
rs = i. Then 
(9 Cbwl = 
Clog2il - bg2rl if log, r - [log, r] < log, i - [log, i], 
[log, i] - [log, r] - 1 otherwise. 
Hence 
(ii) for i E I, (where n E IV) 
n - 1 - [log,s] 3 
i 
ff (I) + [log, r] - 1 if log, r - [log, r] d log, i - [log, i] 
a(Z) + Clog2 rl otherwise, 
with equality holding in both cases if Z is simple. 
(iii) In particular if Z E [O, f), i.e. if o(Z) > 0, then for i E r 
n - 1 - Ch2sl = 
[log, r] - 1 if log, r - [log, r] 6 log, i - [log, i] 
Clog2rl 
otherwise. 0 
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Theorem 4.2. Let I G CO,+) be a simple interval with a(Z) = d > 0. For all Y 3 1 dejine 
intervals J(r) and H(r) as follows: 
J(r) = [0, l] n 
2[log,rl+d+ 1 
- I and H(r) = [0, l] I-I 






Proof. We begin with a reformulation of Lemma 3.1. 
Lemma 4.3. For all i, n E N with i < 2”’ I, i odd, 
,.;, Dk (j&i) Dn-k-l ($7). 
m = i or (2” - i). 
I < 2’+ 1,s < 2”-k 
Proof. By Lemma 3.1 and Definition 3.5 
1 
=2 
Now since by Corollary 3.2, D&(x) = 0 for all x E [0, l] except when x = j/2kt’ for odd 
j with 0 < j < 2&+‘, it follows that 
Dk A Dn-k.el y& = (2 2 r,,;r,=i D.(&)D’+&+ 
r <2k+‘,s < 2”-” 
Since the Dk E 9 we also have by Lemma 3.3 that 
Dk V Dn-k-1 
and the result follows. 0 
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Returning to the main proof, if we reverse the order of summation of the expression 
in (4.3) we obtain 
n - 1 - [log, s] 
c 
T,SE N 
1 “;D*(++-I (&). (11) 
k = [log, r] 
r,=i or (2”+‘-i) 
Now summing this equation over the intereval I, we get: 
n - I - [IO&S] 
DnU)=i c c c 
odd *<*“+’ SE(I/I). k = [log, r] 
P~&(++L-I (+) (12) 
or se(i/r). 
where the final sum is treated as vacuous if the lower limit exceeds the upper. Noting 
that ie I,,* 2”-d < i < 2n-d’1 we may deduce from (12) and from the symmetry of 
(11) in r and s, that: 
n - 1 - [log, s] 
DnU) 2 c c c 
odd r < 2’“md”2 s E (I/r). k = [log, r] 
14’&(++-+). (13) 
or SE (r/r,, 
The inequality (13) is in fact a rather good one, since a similar argument o the one 
above shows that by slightly altering the bound on r the inequality may be reversed. 
Thus: 
n - 1 - [log,s] 
Q,U)G c c c 
odd r < 2’“+ ‘I’& s E (I/r). k = [log, r] 
rZ&(&)h (+). (14) 
or’SE(llr). 
We now examine the upper bound n - 1 - [log, s] in the third summation of (13) 
and (14). By Lemma 4.l(ii) this is d + [log, r] - 1 in the case when s E (I/r),, except if 
log, i - [log, i] < log, Y - 1 [log, r] (where i = r-s). In this latter case we get an extra 
positive value for k of d + [log, r]. To cope with this exceptional case we define 
intervals J’(r) and H’(r) as follows: 
r J’(r) = I n 0, 2 [log, rl + d + I 
) 
and H’(r) = In by 2’l,,Lr, +  ,). 
The last two summations of (13) and (14) may now be rewritten as follows: 
n - 1 - [log, s] 
c c 
s E V/r). k = [log, r] 
/G&t ($+-I (+) 
[log,r]+d- 1 
=c c 
s E U/r). k = [log, r] 
PW~(&)D.-~-I (5) 
+ 1 Pn 
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and 
n - I - [log,s] 
c c 
s E K/a k = [log, r] 




Now for any interval K c [0, 1/2k+‘), it follows from the definition of K, that 
,; Dn-k-i(&) = &k-i (2k+1SW. (17) 
n 
Consequently, reversing the order of summation on the right-hand sides of (15) and 
(16) we obtain respectively the expressions 
Clog, r] + d - 1 
1 
k = [log, I] 
/@h (+&),.,, (7-I) 
and 
P;,og~r,~~,og~r~(2~1DI:lil)D.[loelrl-1(2c’”:’i1~H’o). (19) 
Notice that the intervals 
2[log,rl + d + I 
-J'(r) and 
2 Clw2 ,I + ’ 
-H'(r) 
r r 
are respectively just the intervals J(r) and H(r) of the statement of the theorem. 
If we now substitute the expression corresponding to (18) + (19) for the last two 
summations in (13) and (14) respectively, the upper and lower limits provided by (13) 
and (14) both converge to the same quantity as n + cc and we obtain in the limit the 
statement of the theorem, as we now show. 
First we note that after the above substitution is carried out (13) and (14) become 
respectively 
+ &fkg,r, +d D[logzrl + d ( ’ )D.-[,,,+-, (J(r)) 2[lo&r] +d + I 
+ CL;logg] 4~%~1 (2~,~g~~,+,)Dn-~log~r,-i(H(‘))] (20) 
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and 
same expression in 1 square brackets as in (20) ’ (21) 
Now (20) can be written in the form 
C(n - &/21 + d 
DnU) 3 c /L; Bj” 
j=O 
(22) 
where the BJ are of the form 
B,?= 2 
all odd r s.t. 
2i-d(r<2i+l 
Dj(~).D~_j_~ !,,,~~~~~~;t). (23) 
Here of course j plays the role of k in (20). Note that the numbers of terms in By are 
finite numbers depending on j and d but not on n. Now since 
c 
all odd I ~.t. 
i G r c 2j+ 1 
we have at once that 
0 < By d 1 for all j, n. (24) 
Also, for fixed j, as n -+ CC , py + ~j and D, _j _ 1 + D, SO clearly Bj” + Bj where Bj is 
some limit < 1. Similarly from (21) we obtain 
C(n + 1 WI + d 
DnU)G c p;Bj” (25) 
j=O 
where the Bj” are as above. 
We now show that 
D(Z) = f PjBj. (26) 
j=O 
Since D,(Z) + D(Z) as n + cc it is enough to show that the upper and lower bounds 
given by (25) and (22) both converge to Cy=, PjBj. For this it clearly suffices to show 
that for any b E FV 
[n/21 + b 
jz jzo & BJ = jEo CLJ B_i. (27) 
To show (27) fix E > 0 and choose M such that 
(28) 
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Then x7=,+ I pj < ~13, SO 
m 
j=$+l pjBj<i. 
Now since & + ~j as n + co, (28) implies that for large enough n 
Also by Lemma 3.6(i),(ii), (vii) 
asn-b co. 






Now for n > 2M, 
/‘~‘~b~~B;- ~ pisjl~ ~ ,~;B;-~jBj,+/c’~b~~s:/+l ~ ~jS,l 
j=O j=O j=O j=M+l j=M+l 
and by (29) and (32) each of the last two terms is bounded by s/3 for large enough n, 
and clearly the first term can be made less than s/3 for large enough n since & + pj 
and By + Bj. Thus for large enough n, the left-hand side is bounded by E. This 
completes the proof of (27) and hence of (26). 






k = [log, r] 
Reformulating the above by reversing the order of summation we obtain the state- 
ment of Theorem 4.2 as required. 0 
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We are now in a position to prove the main result of this section. Let B denote the 
set of points in [0, l] whose binary expansion is finite, i.e. 
B = {i/2”Ii, n E N, 0 < i < 2”). 
Theorem 4.4. (i) If a E B and a # 1 then 
lim D(a, a + 4 = +cc 
EL0 & 
Similarly, (ii) if a E B and a # 0 then 
lim D(u - E, a) = +co. 
&\I0 E 
Proof. We shall prove first the special case of (i) when a = 0 and then deduce the 
general result. 
We must prove that lim, I o D(0, E)/E = + co. Note first that it suffices to prove that 
for d E N lim,,,, D(0, 2-d)/2-d = + co. This is clear since for arbitrary E E (0, $) there 
isad~Nsuchthat2-d<c<2-d+’ and for this d, D(0, E)/E 2 4 D(0, 2-d)/2-d. For 
alldEfVletZd=(2- (d+l) 2-d) and Jd = (0, 2-d). Note that o(Zd) = d. From Theorem 








Summing (33), noting that by Theorem 3.10, D(Jd) = I,“=, D(Zd), we get 
d-l 
D(Jd) 2 1 P-j 1 




Separating out the cases when r = 1 (and j = 0) and using Lemma 3.2 we get: 
d-1 p. d-l 
D(Jd) 2 C 2 D (Jd-j-l) + C pj 1 Dj 
j=O j=t Z<r<zJ+ 
(&)D(y-Jd). (35) 
I odd 
NOW the second term on the right side of the inequality (35) is greater than or equal to 
d-l 
jzr pj[Dj(Z”)D(Jd) + Dj(Z’)D(Jd-‘) + ..* + Dj(Zj-‘)D(Jd-‘“)I. (36) 
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By symmetry Dj(I”) = 3 for all j > 1, and since by 3.6(iv), cfr k clj + $ as d + cc , the 
expression (36) may be written 
d-l 
($ - G)D(Jd) + c pj[Dj(z’)D(Jd-l) + *.a + Dj(zj-l)D(Jd-j+l)] (37) 
j=2 
where 6 > 0 and 6 --) 0 as d + 00. Using the estimate of (37) in place of the second term 
on the right of (35) we deduce that for any 6 > 0 
d-1 /‘. 
(2 + 6) D(Jd) > c f D(Jd-‘-‘) 
j=O 
(38) 
for all sufficiently large d. Now choose real numbers q and A with 
3 < q < 1 and 3 < A < l/211(2 - r/). (39) 
To simplify the notation we denote D(Jd) by zd. So, by (38) and (39), for all sufficiently 
large d 
d-1 p. 
qzda c $zd-j-1. 
j=O 
Claim. For all suficiently large d there is some i > 1 such that 
Proof. If the claim fails then there are arbitrarily large d such that zd/zd_ i < 1’ for all 
i < d, and hence such that 
But by Lemma 2.2(b), and the inequalities (39) 
So by taking d to be sufficiently large we have a contradiction. Thus the claim is 
proved. 0 
Returning to the main proof, by the claim above, let M E N be sufficiently large that 
for ah d > M there exists i 2 1 such that zd 2 Aizd_i. Then by iteration it follows that 
for any d > M, zd > Adpk zk for some k < M. Hence zd > cild for some positive constant 
c independent of d. It follows that for d > M 
3 > ~(22)~ -+ 00 as d-+ CC 
since 21 > 1. Hence limELo D(0, E)/E = + CC as required. 
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In order to complete the proof of Theorem 4.4 we must now generalise the above 
result for arbitrary points a E B A [0, 11. 
We define a point a E [0, l] to be right-precipitous if it satisfies the condition of 
Theorem 4.4(i) and left-precipitous if it satisfies the condition of Theorem 4.4(ii). We 
have shown that 0 is right-precipitous. By the symmetry of D, 1 is left-precipitous. We 
now show that f is left-precipitous. For 0 < E < $ the interval (4 - E, f) is simple and 
~((4 - E, f)) = 1. So considering the term given by d = 1,j = 0, r = 1 in the equation 
of Theorem 4.2 with I = (f - E, i), 
D(f - E, f) 2 @&)D(l - 2E, 1) 2 4 D(1 - 2&, 1). 
Hence the left-precipitousness of 3 follows from the left-precipitousness of 1. The 
right-precipitousness of 3 now follows immediately by symmetry. It remains to prove 
that any point a E B n (0, f) is both left- and right-precipitous. This clearly suffices 
since by symmetry the same would then be true for a E B n (f, 1). 
Let a = i/2” with i < 2”-r, i odd and n > 2. Let E > 0 be sufficiently small so that 
I = (i/2”, i/2” + E) is simple. Then a(Z) = n - [log, i] + 1. Hence by considering the 
term on the right-hand side of the equation of Theorem 4.2 given by j = n - 2, 
d = n - [log, i] + 1, r = i we obtain 
and since by Lemma 3.2(i), Dne2 (i/2”-‘) # 0, the right precipitousness of i/2”-’ now 
follows from the right-precipitousness of 4. 
By a completely analogous argument the left-precipitousness of i/2” follows from 
the left-precipitousness off. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.4. 0 
It is an interesting open problem whether any other points of the interval (0, 1) 
except those in B have the precipitous properties of Theorem 4.4. It is however clear 
from the Heine-Bore1 theorem that not every point a of (0, 1) can have both the 
properties (i) and (ii) of Theorem 4.4. 
5. Further properties of S and generalizations 
In this section we shall generalise the * operation in order to give an alternative 
characterisation of D (equivalently S) together with some further results along these 
lines. 
Let J? denote the set of symmetric countably additive measures on 9. Notice that 
9 c %%?. 
In order to prove some further properties of D we need to generalise the operation 
* to Z. For TEX and nE N let cr,... ,c, be those points in [0, l] for which 
T(x) > l/2”, let ao, al, . . . ,us list {cr, . . . , c,} u {i/2”10 < i < 2”) in increasing order, 
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and set 
T’“’ = f: T(aJUq + “il T(ai, ai+l)’ u@+oi+l)/2. 
i=O i=O 
Notice that T(“) is symmetric if T is, D, (“)= D,forn >mandifTEFthen T= T(“) 
for all n eventually. 
The next lemma shows that T is a uniform limit of the T(“). 
Lemma 5.1. Let TE SF and E > 0. Then there is an no E N such thatfor all n 3 no and 
Odadb<l, 
1 T(a, b) - T(“)(a, b)l < E, 
and similarly for closed and halfopen intervals. 
Proof. Pick no such that for n > no if ao, a,, . . . ,a, lists 
{xl T(x) > l/2”} u {i/2”10 < i G 2”) 
in increasing order then T(ai, ai+ 1) < s/2. Such an no must exist, otherwise by K&rig’s 
Lemma we could produce intervals (c,, d,) 2 (c”+~, d,,,) such that 
0 < d, - c, < l/2”, T(c,, d,) 3 42 and T(x) -C l/2” for all x E (c,, d,) which contra- 
dicts countable additivity. Then for n 2 no, if ai < a < ai+ 1, aj < b < aj+ 1, 
IT(a,b)-T’“‘(a,b)I< T(at,ai+l)+ T(Uj,Uj+l)<E. 0 
Nowfor T,,T,~XandO,<a,<bdefine 
(TI * T2)(a, b) = lim (Tp’* Tr))(a, b) 
“,nz’cC 
and similarly for closed and halfopen intervals. Notice that this definition extends the 
earlier one given for T,, Tz E 9. Our next two lemmas show that this limit exists 
(uniformly) and that T, * T2 E A?. 
Lemma 5.2. Let T,, T2 E SF. Then for E > 0 there is an no E N, depending only on 
TI and mo, depending only on T,, such that for all n, n’ b no,m, m’ > m. and 
O<a<b<l, 
I T;) * T~‘(u, b) - Tl”” * TF” (a, b)l < E 
and similarly for closed and halfopen intervals. In particular TI * T, is well defined. 
Proof. First we show that for any TE S and E > 0 there is no E N such that for all 
n,n’~no,0<a<b<1andallRE9 
IT@)*R(a,b) - T(“‘)*R(a,b)I <E. 
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In view of the form of R E 9 it is sufficient to show that there is n, E N such that for all 
0 d e < 1 and 0 Q a < b d 1 if n, n’ 2 n, then 
lT’“‘*U,(a,b)- T’““*U,(a,b)l<&. 
To this end, by Lemma 5.1 pick no such that for all n 3 no and 0 < a < b d 1, 
1 T(u b) - 2 T’“‘(u 2 b)l < E/4. 
Then 
F * Ue(u, b) - T(“‘) * U&z, b) 
and this is, in modulus, less than E. 
The lemma now follows by noting that 
) T;) * T~)(u, b) - T:“” * Z-7” (a, b)l 
< #“h r:“‘(u, b) - T:“‘)* Tr’(u, b)l + IT:‘)* T:“‘(u, b) - T:““* T:““(u, b)( 
and TF’, Ty” E %. 0 
Lemma 5.3. Let T,, T, E X. Then T1 * T2 E 2. 
Proof. Clearly from the definition Tl * T2 is a finitely additive symmetric measure 
on %. To show countable additivity it suffices to show that for c < 1, 
lim T, * T2(c, c + 6) = 0. 
d-+0 
But, by Lemma 5.2, given E > 0 there is no E N such that for n 3 no 
I T, * T2 (a, b) - T:“’ * TF) (a, b) 1 < 42. 
Since Tp’* Ty” is countably additive we can find 6 > 0 such that 
, T:n,, * TgO, cc, c + @I < 42, 
so 
IT,*T,(c,c+i?)l<~ 
as required. 0 
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Lemma 5.4. Suppose F, T, T,, E X for n E N and 
lim T,, = T 
n-m 
(not necessarily uniformly). Then 
lim F * T. = F * T. 
n+m 
Proof. Let 0 d a < b < 1. We show the required result for the open interval (a, b); the 
result for closed or halfopen intervals is similar. Given E > 0 by Lemmas 5.1, 5.2 pick 
nOsuchthatforn,m>,nO,andanyO<c<d<l 
1 F * T(c, d) - F(“) * T(“‘)(c, d)l < E, 
1 F(“‘)(c, d) - F(“)(c, d)J < E, 
1 TCm)(c, d) - T(c, d)l < E. (40) 
Also, for each m there is ml(m) (assume ml(m) 2 no) such that for any m’ 2 ml(m) and 
anyO<c<dd 1, 
) T,(c, d) - T;“(c, d)l < E. 
Since for H E #, F(“O) * H (a, b) is a jxed Jinite linear combination of terms involving 
H((e,f) n [0, 11) for some fixed intervals (e,f), there is m. 2 no such that for m 2 mo, 
I T((e,f) n CO, 11) - Gdkf) n CO, 11)l < E 
for all such (e,f). Hence for m 2 m. and m’ > ml(m), 
I T’““((e,f) n [0, 11) - TF”((e,f) n [0, l])I < 3~. 
for all such (e,f). Consequently 
IF fno) * TCm’) (a, b) - F cno) * T;m”(a, b) 1 < 3~. 
Similarly using (40), for n 2 no, 
IF(“) * TF”(a, b) - F(“O) * Tz”(a, b)( < E, 
IF(“) * T(“‘)(a, b) - F(“O) * TCm’)(u, b)( < E 
and hence for m > mo, n 3 no and m’ B ml (m) 
IF(“)* Tfm’) (a, b) - F(“)* TF”(a, b)l < Lk, 
as required. 0 
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Corollary 5.5. Let T, T,, E $P and let C,“=, a, be a series of non-negative terms summing 
to 1. Then C.“=, a,, T,, E 2 and 
‘x 
*T= c a,(T,,* T). 
n=O 
Proof. The first part is standard. For the last part, since 
lim fn i ai Ti = f ai Ti 
n-m i=O i=O 
where f, = (CyEo ai)-’ (or f” = 1 if the expression on the right-hand side is not 
defined), it is sufficient by Lemma 5.4 to show that 
(h.joaJ) i=. * T=fk i ai(Ti* T). (41) 
But 
(~~o~~Tj”‘)*T’“‘=I,~o~~(T1.)-T’“’) 
and taking the limit as n, m -+ cc gives (41), as required. 0 
For T E 2 we define 
E,(xk) = lim ET~n,(xk). 
n-m 
It is straightforward to check that this limit exists and hence that Lemma 3.4 holds 
also for F, G E 2’. Let 
W= ~ 2~iDi. 
i=O 
By Corollary 5.5, WE 2. 
Theorem 5.6. (i) D is the unique measure F E 2 satisfying 
F= W*F. 
(ii) Zf To E X and 
T n+1= W* T,, for n E N 
then the T, E S? and 
lim T,, = D. 
n-m 
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Proof. (i) We shall show that 
D= W*D 
The uniqueness will follow from part (ii). 
Let E > 0 and v E N be such that 
i 2/Ai 2 1 - E. 
i=O 
(42) 
Notice that by Lemma 3.6, for each E > 0 the inequality (42) holds for all v eventually. 
Let no > v be such that for all it > no and 0 < i < v 
12p;+l -2,Uil<c 
v+l 
Then using Lemmas 3.1 and 3.6(i), (ii) we get for it 2 no 
IDn+~(a,b)- i 2PiDi*Dn-i(a,b)l 
i=O 
< D,+l(~,b)- i 2,Uy+‘Di*D,-i(Q,b) +E 
i=O 
n-u-1 
d i=F+I /.J,T+lDi*Dn-i(a,b) +E< ~E+c=~E. 
Since lim,, m D,_i = D for all i < v, we have by Lemma 5.4 
lim 2~iDi*D,_i = 2piDi*D. 
n-rm 
It follows that 
D(a,b)- i 2piDi*D(a,b) d 3~ 
i=O 
which gives the required result. 
(ii) If T, E SF then by Lemma 5.3, T,+ 1 = W* T, E SF’. 
To show the last part we first show by induction on k that lim,,, ETm(.xk) = ED(xk). 
For k = 0 this is clear. So assume the result for r < k. Then 
E T,+l(~k) - E,(xk) = f 2Pi(Eo,*rn(xk) - ED,*D(~~)), 
i=O 
and, as in Lemma 3.4 
EDi,, - ED,*~(x~) = E,,(xk)(E~,,(xk) - E,(xk)).t(l + (- l)k) 
k-l 
+ ) 1 ( - l)‘(S)E,i(x’)(E,(x’) - ED@‘)). 
*=o 
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Using the method of proof of Lemma 3.7 it now follows that 
lim sup )ETm(xk) - E,(xk)) = 0 
“02 mat 
giving 
lim E,,,(xk) = ED(xk) 
“-a 
as required. 
Now, by the method of proof of Theorem 3.9, we obtain that for 0 < a < b < 1, 
lim,,, T,(a, b) exists and, furthermore, equals D(a, b) (and similarly for closed and 
halfopen intervals). 0 
Theorem 5.6 provides a practical method of calculating the El,(xk) and hence of 
approximating D (in addition to the obvious approximation by D,). For it is easy to 
check that 
W*W=2W-Do 
whilst, by the theorem 
(43) 
D= W*D 
Using Lemma 3.4 we obtain from (43) 
(44) 
k-l 
2Ew(xk) - 2-k = f(1 + ( - l)k)Ew(~k)2 + 1 f( - l)‘Ew(x’)’ (5) 
r=O 
and from (44) 
k-l 
E,(xk) = + (1 + ( - l)k) E,(xk)Ew(xk) + 1 ) ( - l)‘E,(x’)E,(x’)(;), 
r=O 
giving a recursive relation for ED(xk). If we now define 
%(x5 Y) = nxz<ny(;)(;<(- l~ED(xk+r(n;k)) 
then by standard properties of Bernstein polynomials, 
lim S,(x, y) = D(x, y). 
n-rm 
Applying this in the case n = 29 yields S, with a density function which loosely 
resembles a catenary between 0 and 1 but with a noticeable hump at ) and rather less 
distinguishable bumps at i and 2. This might then be conjectured to be roughly the 
“shape” of D although we have no estimate of how quickly the S, converge. Other, 
more sophisticated methods could be employed, for example (as mentioned before) 
utilizing simultaneously the equations from Theorem 4.2 and the moments of D or 
282 J.B. Paris et al. 1 Annals qf Pure and Applied Logic 70 (1994) 243-285 
randomly producing formulae from ,&, and valuations for them to obtain an approxi- 
mation of D along with an estimate of accuracy. 
As remarked in Section 2 the h(a) can be viewed as the expected (truth) value of the 
sentence CI when the pi are treated as random propositional variables which are true 
(i.e. take value 1) with probability f. However, in the context of modelling rrF- 
descriptors by random sentences as described in Section 1, this assumption that the 
pi all have the same expected value f seems questionable. Now, surely, if we are to 
argue in support of D being an approximation pz, then would it not make more sense 
to take D instead of D,, right from the start? However, if this were to produce a new 
limit D’, why not repeat the argument and start with D’ in place of D, and so on? 
Where woud such a process end? In fact, as our next theorem shows, whatever 
countably additive measure T we start with the limit of this process will concentrate 
all the measure towards 0 and 1. Expressed aphoristically, in the limit randomness 
becomes certainty! 
Let 52 be the measure uniquely defined by 9 by 
Q(0, E) = sZ(1 - E, 1) = 4 for all 0 < E < 1. 
Note that Sz is a symmetric but not countably additive measure on 9, thus Q +! X. 
Theorem 5.7. Let T E X’ and dejine 
T; = T, 
T;,, = i 2/.4+’ T;_j* T;, 
j=O 
,;+I = lim Ty. 
i+n 
Then each Ti E SP and 
lim T;l = T:(O)-U, + (1 - 2T,0(O))-Q + T:(l)- ul. 
n+m 
We denote lim,,, T: by T," 
Thus applying the process discussed above to measure T E 2 we obtain a measure 
which gives the same weight to the points 0 and 1 as the initial measure did and 
distributes all the remaining weight according to S2. Consequently, the only measure 
from & which is ajixed point of the process is the trivial measure R for which R (0) = 4 
and R(1) = 4. 
Proof of Theorem 5.7. By Lemma 5.3, to show each Tz E X it is sufficient to show 
that the T: E X, and clearly by analogy it suffices to show that T,’ E S’. To show this 
we first note that using Lemmas 5.1 and 5.3, Lemma 3.7 goes through with T,” in place 
of D,. 
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Secondly we note that with some provisos (for the case when T:(O) # 0 and a = 0) 
Lemma 3.8 holds with T," in place of D,. To see this we may assume Too # Do 
(otherwise we already have the result). Let II > 0 be such that for m large, x E [0, 11, 
T,O. (m) (x) < 1 - A. 
We now consider two cases. First suppose T,"(O) = 0. We proceed as in the proof of 
Lemma 3.8 but with D, replaced by T;I, 56/4 replaced by 6(1 + A/4) and 6132 by 
6A2/64, to obtain in place of (7) 
for sufficiently large m, r, by Lemma 5.2, with m independent of n. Notice that 
T,!(O) = 0 for allj, so T~9'"'(0) = 0 for all m,j. We can now argue as in the proof of 
Lemma 3.8, that for large n 
T: K 1 .--,u+-&) n [OJI) n+l 
and this tends to 6 (1 - 1’/32), giving a contradiction. [Notice that since we may have 
T,?""')(a) > 0 for more than onej, we cannot repeat the proof of Lemma 3.8 exactly 
and instead have to use 
(45) 
in place of ~+(56/4)-2p$'D,-(~). Estimating C4=o 2~: in this expression by 1, 
maxb T?'(")(b) forj > 1 by 1 and maxb Tivcrn) 
less thai or equal to 
(b) by 1 - 1, (45) can be further seen to be 
which is the estimate employed above.] 
Now suppose T:(O) > 0. Then for a E (0,l) the proof goes through as before. To 
cover the case a = 0 (or 1) we show that lim,,, T:(O) (or equivalently T."( 1)) exists, 
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and that given 6 > 0 there is E > 0 and no such that for n 3 no 
T,“(O, E) < 6. (46) 
This latter result can be easily proved by a similar argument to that used in the case 
T(0) = 0, the only difference being that we restrict b to being non-zero. The existence 
of lim,,, T:(O) follows since 
7-,O(O)=~(l-7-,O(O,&)-TT,O[&,1-&]-TT,0(1-&,1)). 
Armed with these properties of the T,” we can now show, as in the proof of Theorem 
3.9, that for 0 < a < b < 1, lim,,, Tf(a, b) exists, (and similarly for closed and 
halfopen intervals), whilst the same result can be proved for an interval, say [0, b) by 
splitting it up into {0}, (0, E), [a, b) etc. 
This shows then that all the Ti E 2. Now, as in Theorem 5.6(i) we can show that 
T;+’ = W”* T;;+’ (47) 
where W” = C,??, 2~~ T,!‘, and, as in the discussion following that theorem, 
W”* W” = 2W” - T;. (48) 
Putting X, = ET; (x2), /I,, = E,,(x2), then 4 < c1,, /I,, < 1 and from (47) and (48) using 
Lemma 3.4 (for the extended *) 
(Y - P”*%+ 1 + a, n+l p,’ + a = 2pn - CI,. 
From these it is easy to see that the cln, /I,, are monotone and the limit /I of the /In 
satisfies (2p - 1)2(2 - /I) = 0, giving in this case fi = 4, o! = 3 where M = lim,,, CC,,. 
Hence it must be that lim,,, T;(&,l--c)=OforO<~since 
&(x2) < fT;(&, 1 - e)((l - E)~ + e2) + +(l - T;(E, 1 - a)). 12. 
In the limit of the T;t then all measure is either on or infinitessimally close to 0 or 1. In 
fact the measure on the point 0 never changes, since, by (47) and (48), 
T;+‘(O) = f Wn(0) + f T:+‘(O), 
f W”(0) + f W”(0) = 2W”(O) - T;;(O), 
giving W”(0) = T:(O) = T:(O) f or all n. It follows then that the limit of the T[ is 
T$(O)- U, + (1 - 2 T,0(0))*52 + T:(l)* U1 as required. 0 
Conclusion 
The special form of the limiting, fixed-point distribution of Theorem 5.7 is to some 
extent a consequence of our initial choice of the connective A and its dual v. If 
instead we start with A , v and c* and its dual, +, we would obtain an essentially 
different and non-trivial fixed-point distribution. In terms of the second motivation 
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described in the introduction, it is perhaps not clear which combination of connectives 
should be chosen, although it certainly seems that on grounds of symmetry for each 
connective chosen the dual should also be included. One rather natural choice might 
be to start with all the sixteen binary connectives. If we do this, we would again obtain 
a fixed-point distribution assigning all measure at, or infinitessimally close to, 0 and 1. 
A second choice would be to take the connectives functioning as p A q, p v q, 
-up A q, lp v q, p A lq, p v lq, lp A lq, lp v lq. It is easy to see that this 
(even starting with just A,” = { po, . . . , pm_ 1 } ) yields exactly the same results as in 
this paper where we choose conjunction and disjunction (starting with 
A,” = {PO, . . . ,Pm-l~~Po~...~~Pm-l)). 
There is clearly some independent interest in asking what analogues T of the 
measure S and what corresponding fixed-point distributions T,” can be obtained by 
various choices of combinations of connectives of various arities, and this remains an 
area of future research. 
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